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FRANCIS A. GABOR*

The Trade Act of 1974-Title IV:
Considerations Involved In Granting
Most-Favored-Nation Status to
the Nonmarket Economy Countries
The Trade Act of 19741 incorporated the implementation of the United
States' pledge made in the Soviet-American Trade Agreement of 1972,2 and
provisions allowing most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union and
other East European countries. Historically, the most-favored-nation (MFN)
clause has been a basic principle of international commerce and has become a
crucial issue in the development of Soviet-American trade relations. The inclusion of this provision evoked great controversy over the trade bill, causing
almost a two year deadlock in Congress which demanded that the Soviet Union
liberalize its policies on the emigration of its citizenry3 as the price of trade
detente. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was, consequently, incorporated into
Title IV (§ 402), and the future of the entire trade bill was threatened.'
Historical Context
Since the early 1900s, the Soviet Union has had various difficulties with the
most-favored-nation clause in its trade relations with the United States. Its
state-controlled economic and foreign trade system caused considerable conflict
in the application of the unconditional MFN clause. Following the Revolution of
1917, most of the Western countries completely rejected nondiscriminatory

*Dr. Jur.,Eotvos L. Science Univ.,Budapest, 1967; J.D. Tulane Univ., New Orleans 1975; LLM.,
Univ. of California, Berkeley; presently Assoc. Professor at Memphis State Univ., School of Law;
member of Washington, D.C., Tennessee and American Bar Associations.
1H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
'11 Int'l Legal Materials 1321 (1972).
Ibid, § 402.
4See text at notes 20-21 infw.
sLawrence, Passage of Trade Reform Bill Likely, Mojor Hurdle Cleared, 17 J. Com. 8, 8-10
(1974).
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treatment in commercial treaties with the Soviet Union, 6 rationalizing: (1) that
complete monopolization of commerce presented insuperable difficulties with
the traditional most-favored-nation clause,I and (2) that the Soviet Union had
defaulted in the payment of the prewar debts of the Russian Empire.,
The United States accepted this viewpoint until 1935, when the first SovietAmerican commercial agreement was concluded granting nondiscriminatory
treatment for the export of Soviet products into the American market.'
However, in 1947 the Soviet Union failed to join the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade' 0 with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Western nations,
and relations became gradually more strained during the Cold War. Difficulties
between the Soviet Union and the United States reached a peak during the
Korean War as illustrated by the following opinion of the minority members of
the House Ways and Means Committee, later accepted by the full Congress: I
It is outrageous that our American soldiers should be fighting Communists in Korea,
while at the same time all the Communist countries are enjoying the benefits made by
the United States .... We recommend that this rank and preposterous inconsistency
in our foreign policy be removed at once by the denying to Russia and Communist
China, and to any Communist satellite country the benefit of the reduced rates which we
have granted to the free world.
As a result, Congress passed the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 195112
which directed the President to withdraw or suspend the most-favored-nation
status of all countries under the control of international Communism. Between
September 1951 and July 1952, the President, by proclamation 3 and
subsequent letters of implementation, directed that the congressional mandate
be carried out by suspending the MFN policy toward all Communist countries
except Yugoslavia.
This policy of discriminatory treatment has continued until the present time,
with the exception of the American policy toward Poland. 14 The Trade Expansion Act of 1962's simply reaffirmed the previous trade policy of the United

IF. MADL, Fo-EIoN TRADE MONOPOLY: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw
7

(1967).

Domke and Hazard, State Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 52 AM. J.
(1958). See text at notes 44-52 supra.

INT'L. 1

'Ibid.
'49 Stat. 3805 (1935), E.A.S. No. 81. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to purchase thirty

million dollars in American commodities within the ensuing twelve-month period.
1
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents,
Volume IV, Text of the General Agreement, Geneva, 1969.
"H.R. Rep. No. 1612, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1951).

U.S.C. §1361 (1970).
1316 Fed. Reg. 7635 (1951). The President actually took away the MFN status for the Soviet
1219

Union on December 23, 1951.
"In December 1960, President Eisenhower restored the MFN status to Poland due to its
increased independence from Moscow and its efforts since 1956 to strengthen its ties with the West.
22 U.S.C. §2407 (1970).
"519 U.S.C. §1801 (1970).
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States. Section 231, depriving the President of any discretional authority,
denied MFN status to "any country or area dominated by Communism"
regardless of whether that Communism was a national or international.
variety.16 This strict prohibition was somewhat relaxed with the enactment of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963,17 which permitted trade concessions for the
products of certain Communist countries (i.e., Poland and Yugoslavia), if the
President determined that it was in the national interest and would promote the
independence of such countries from domination or control by international
Communism. "8
During the sixties, the foreign trade policies of the United States in this area
remained relatively unchanged, while the European Socialist states experienced
dramatic political and economic reconciliations with the countries belonging to
the European Economic Community and Japan. The relaxed atmosphere
between these nations created by political detente enabled the elimination of a
major portion of the trade barriers, the cold war embargo and discriminating
tariff treatments. In addition to political detente and reconciliation, other
factors providing the main catalysts in promoting trade relations were: (1) traditional complementary market relations, and (2) general extension of unconditional most-favored-nation status.
Upon examination of these factors in the American-Soviet context, it is
apparent that none of these played a role in promoting economic relations. To
the contrary, these factors constituted restraining forces during the sixties as
evidenced by: (1) the political confrontations (Cuba 1962, Berlin 1963, Vietnam
1966-1972); (2) the lack of natural, complementary market relations; and (3)
the continuous denial of most-favored-nation status. 19
Currently, political relations and economic conditions continue to constitute
20
the determining factors in the development of East-West trade relations.
While both the internal economic situation of the United States and concern
about international peace were reminiscent of 1935, improved detente spawned
the 1972 Soviet-American Trade Agreement. The Trade Agreements of 1935
and 1972 granted similar MFN status to the Soviet Union, differing only in the
contingencies required from the Soviet Union.
Legal Framework
Article I of the Soviet-American Trade Agreement of 1972 proposed a recip-

"Tlrade Expansion Act of 1969, 19 U.S.C. 1861, (1970).
"177 Stat. 390, §402.
"A. T. Wolf, "Effect of U.S. Granting of Most-Favored Nation Treatment to Imports from
Eastern Europe; Polish Experience," Association for Comparative Economic Studies, Spring 1973.
"S. PIsAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE, 7-15 (1970).
20
Redri, East-West Trade, IVI Kulgazdasag, 65 (1972).
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rocal exchange of MFN treatment in all matters pertaining to custom duties and
charges without any further conditions. However, the Agreement required
congressional approval for extending authority to the President to grant MFN
status; and this requirement became a part of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974,
Congress having attached the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the bill in Section
402,21 which provides that no country shall be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory tariff treatment or United States government credits, credit guarantees, or
investment guarantees if the President determines that such country:
1. [D]enies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate,
2. imposes more than a nominal tax for emigration or on visas or other documents
required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever or,
3. otherwise imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fare, fee or other charge on any
citizen as a result of his or her desire to emigrate.2"
Section 403 authorizes the President to grant MFN treatment to nonmarket
economy countries by entering into bilateral agreements 3 with these countries
or by their entrance into an "appropriate multilateral agreement" to which the
United States is also a party.2" Section 404 provides nondiscriminatory treatment in commercial agreements whenever such agreements would promote the
purposes of the bill and are in the national interest.23 There is, however, a
restriction of a three-year time period with possible renewal. Section 406
delineates the procedure for congressional disapproval of any proclamation
under Section 403 and permits annual congressional review of continuances of
nondiscriminatory treatment.
Section 402 caused great dissension in the Congress. The main argument in
favor of its inclusion centered on alleged continuous violations by the Soviet
Union of the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights,2 6 signed
by it in 1948, Article 13(2) of which states: "Every person has the right to leave
any country including his own and to return to his country." '27 In the absence of
effective enforcement of this provision by the United Nations, two traditional
remedies are available: (1) humanitarian protest and (2) humanitarian intervention by individual states. The second alternative would not seem to be viable

='H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §402 (1974).
"Ibid, §402 (b). MFN status would be granted only after a presidential determination and report
to 23
Congress that a particular nation was not violating any of these conditions.
H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §403 (1974).
14Ibid.

"See Staff of Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1 Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R.
10710, The Trade Reform Act of 1973 (1974).
"'G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
"Krisbacher, Aliyah of Soviet Jews: Protection of Emigration Under International Law, 14
HARv. INT'L. L.J. 89 (1973).
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in the Soviet-American superpower context. On the other hand, humanitarian
protest has been raised several times on behalf of Jewish people in recent
history."' Mere protest without political or economic pressure, however, has
rarely been effective. Thus, certain congressional leaders have urged that the
United States use its full economic pressure to guarantee these basic human
rights.
The conflicting arguments surrounding the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
focused on the methods of enforcement of this UN-proclaimed freedom of
emigration. As expressed by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before the
Senate Committee on Finance, the objective of promoting the realization of this
basic human right was not disputed by either side. 2"
This is not a dispute between the morally sensitive and the morally obtuse-it is rather a
problem of choosing between alternatives.
I do not oppose the objective of those who wish to use trade policy to effect the evolution
of Soviet society; it does seem to me, however, that they have chosen the wrong context.
Kissinger defined the purpose of detente as the prevention of a nuclear disaster
and argued that the transformation of Soviet domestic structure was not a
realistic goal for detente. 0 On extending the MFN status to the Soviet Union,
Kissinger asserted that he did not consider the extension of MFN status a
privilege, but rather a removal of the discriminatory aspects of American
foreign trade policy. He concluded by stating:
The extension of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment would for some time to come have
only a modest impact on Soviet exports to the United States, which are largely raw
materials not now subject to substantial tariffs. Thus the major impact of the continued
denial of MFN status to the Soviet Union would be political, not economic.
As a result, he argued that the continuous denial of MFN status to the Soviet
Union might well have a negative effect on and slow down the liberalization of
Soviet emigration policy.'

"For instance, protests were raised against the persecution of the Jewish people in Nazi Germany
and against the Russian pogroms during 1883-1907.
2
Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., I Sess. (1974).
The statement of Secretary Kissinger expressed, of course, the administration viewpoint.
3Ibid.

"Ibid. Summarizing the rate of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel during the past
five years, Kissinger noted that as the United States moved from confrontation to negotiation,
emigration had increased from the sporadic trickle of the 1960s to a relatively steady flow of some
2,500 a month in the 1970s. Between 1969 and 1973, 81,000 Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel. More
recently press reports have indicated a tightening up of this policy.
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On October 18, 1974, after almost two years of constant debate, a compromise was reached by the parties. While the Soviet government refrained
from acknowledging this publicly, it tacitly agreed to specific criteria that allow
greater freedom of emigration.3" Senator Jackson stated that this agreement
would allow approximately 60,000 individuals to emigrate from the Soviet
Union each year. The agreement was published by the exchanging of letters
between Secretary of State Kissinger and Senator Jackson. 33 On January 14,
1975, Soviet officials rejected this compromise as a basis of implementation of
the 1972 Trade Agreement stating that it violates the principles of noninterference in domestic affairs.
Economic Impact of MFN Status
The economic impact of MFN status has many ramifications. However, in
practical terms, the denial of MFN status has meant that the products of nonmarket economy countries (except Poland and Yugoslavia) are subject to the
full tariff rates provided for in the rate column 2 of the Tariff Act of 1930. All
other countries are enjoying MFN status and receiving treatment under the
much lower column 1 rates,"3 which have been the subject of periodic reductions
resulting from trade concessions. Thus, existing tariff discrimination is based
on the difference between tariffs imposed under the two columns. When this
difference exceeds five percent, it is considered by the International Trade

"3The actual agreement was announced by an exchange of letters between Secretary of State
Kissinger and Senator Jackson, published in the New York Times on October 19, 1974, at p. 10:
The following were assured by Dr. Kissinger as henceforth governing emigration from the Soviet
Union:
1. Punitive acts against would-be emigrants are no longer to be permitted, including loss of job,
demotion and public recrimination.
2. No unreasonable or "unlawful" impediments would be permitted against would-be applicants
such as interference with travel or communications.
3. Applications are to be processed in order of receipt, without discrimination regarding residence,
race, religion, national origin and professional status (an exception is that individuals holding
security clearances may be delayed).
4. Hardship cases are to be processed sympathetically and expeditiously. Persons imprisoned who
previously applied to emigrate are to be given prompt consideration upon release.
S. The suspended emigration tax is to remain suspended.
6. With respect to all the foregoing assurances (Dr. Kissinger wrote) the United States would be
able to bring to the attention of the Soviet leadership any indications that the new criteria were
not being applied. Such representation would receive "sympathetic consideration and
response." Finally, Dr. Kissinger stated in his letter to Mr. Jackson that it would be the
American assumption that with these criteria the rate of emigration would begin to rise promptly
from last year's level and eventually "correspond to the number of applicants."
"Ibid.
"House Comm. on Ways and Means, Selected Provisions of the Tariff and Trade Laws of the
United States, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968).
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Commission to be substantial discrimination."
A research study by the United States International Trade Commission concluded that United States imports from nine Communist countries36 would have
been $22.8 million higher in 1971 if they had enjoyed MFN status, representing
an increase of 10 percent over actual imports of $227 million." While the
granting of MFN status would have a different effect in the case of each country,
the following data provides an estimate of the impact which might have been
expected if MFN had been extended by the United States in 1971.8
Most raw materials and semi-finished products are subject to no duty or to a
duty comparable to those in column one. 39 Consequently, the Soviet Union, the

35

Average Rates of Duty Paid on U.S. Imports From
East Europe, China, and All MFN Countries, 1970 and 1972

COUNTRY

AVERAGE RATE OF DUTY PAW
ON DUTIABLE IMPORTS

1970
All non-M FN countries a .............................................
A lbania ..........................................................
Bulgaria ..........................................................
Czechoslovakia ....................................................
East Germ any .....................................................
H ungary ..........................................................
Rom ania .........................................................
U .S.S.R . .........................................................
People's Republic of China ...........................................
All M FN countries ..................................................
Polandc ...........................................................

23.5
b
20.4
28.5
36.8
22.4
22.8
14.3
b
10.0
7.2

1972

23.9
3.9
24.7
27.2
37.0
20.3
23.0
18.3
22.5
8.6
7.2

aExcluding Bulgaria and China -for both years.
bNot determined.
cPoland receives MFN treatment.
Source: Official U.S Department of Commerce sources.
The discrimination has increased since 1970 as a consequence of the duty reductions under the
Kennedy Round Tariff Agreement. 76 Stat. 872 (1962). From 1970 to 1972, the average rate of duty
on United States dutiable imports increased slightly for the Communist countries from 23.5 percent
to 23.9 percent but declined for the non-Communist countries from 10.0 percent to 8.6 percent.
36
L. Jelacic, Impact on Granting Most Favored Nation Treatment to the Countries of Eastern
Europe and the People's Republic of China, Staff Research Studies No. 6, U.S. Tariff Commission at
8 (1974).
"Ibid. at 12.
"Ibid at 19.
"Ibid. at 15-16.
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main exporter of raw materials, would be least affected by receiving MFN
status. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, would obtain the
greatest benefit from nondiscriminatory tariff treatment, because their exports
consist mainly of finished products and machinery subject to substantially
higher tariff rates.

RANGE OF INCREASE IN IMPORTS

VALUE OF 1971
COUNTRY

IMPORTS BY U.S.

(Thousands of
Dollars)

AFTER EXTENDING MFN
MIN. CHANGE

MAX. CHANGE

(0%)
(+ 18.9%)
(Thousands of Dollars)

USSR

57,599

0

10,886

East Germany

10,131

0

1,915

Czechoslovakia

23,618

0

4,464

Hungary

7,750

0

1,465

Romania

13,771

0

713

Bulgaria

2,614

0

494

Albania

279

0

53

4,916

0

949

120,678

0

22,808

China

As the statistical survey conducted by the Trade Commission4 0 proves,
granting the MFN status would definitely stimulate East European exports.
However, removal of tariff discrimination would constitute only one major
factor; other trade barriers such as credit restrictions (for example, ExportImport Bank loans), shipping requirements, export controls, and quotas, also
play a significant role. 4'1 Moreover, resistant attitudes against Communist
products still exist, as evidenced by boycotts and strikes against such products
in the past,' 2 while the nonmarket character of the Communist economic system

"0Ibid.

"Other barriers to East-West trade were contemplated in a series of preliminary agreements
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. See Osakwe, LegalAspects of Soviet-American Trade:
Problems and Prospects, 48 TuL. L. REv. 539 (1974).
42
Melish, A., United States East European Trade, Staff Research Studies No. 4, U.S. Tariff
Commission at 20-22 (1972).
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constitutes probably another major obstacle in the increase of exports from
these countries. In recent years, the Eastern European countries recognized and
made an effort to diminish this obstacle. The introduction Qf more
market-oriented economic reforms represents an important step in this direc43
tion.
There is little doubt that an exchange of MFN status would benefit both
nations. In 1972, the Soviet Union agreed to settle its Lend-Lease obligations
dependent upon United States extension of MFN treatment." In addition, the
United States received quid pro quo MFN treatment in return for extending it to
45
the Soviet Union.
The obvious economic effect of MFN status is the immediate stimulation and
the increase of East European exports. This would alleviate the major obstacle
of the American-East European trade by providing a better balance of trade
situation for nonmarket economy countries to finance their imports from the
American market. By granting equal treatment for these countries, the
American businessman would gain equal opportunities to compete with the
representatives of the European Economic Community countries and Japan in
46
utilizing a market which provides for a third of the world's population.
Market Disruption
The economic differences between the two systems is the main reason that the
United States requested and received certain legal safeguards and concessions
during the negotiations of the Trade Agreement of 1972. One of the most
important legal safeguards in this context was protection against market
disruption.

Section 405 of the Trade Act includes provisions on market disruption.47 The
principal purpose is to provide special legal safeguards against the pricing
activities of centrally planned economies.
A problem in trade with nonmarket countries is the possibility that such a country,
through its control of distribution of the products which it produces and of the price at
which those articles are sold, could disrupt the domestic market of its trading partners
and injure producers in those countries."

-See

I. VAJDA, FOREIGN TRADE IN A PLANNED EcoNo.y
POLICY, PLANNING 58 (1971).

36 (1971); I. Fmiss, EcoNomc LAws,

"Agreement Regarding Settlement of Lend Lease, Reciprocal Aid and Claims, 23 U.S.T. 2910,
T.I.A.S. No. 7478, reproduced in 11 II'rL LEOAL MATERALS 1315 (1972).
"Ilbid.

"See International Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress January 1977,
Executive Office of the President, Council on International Economic Policy.
17 H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 405 (1974).
"House Committee on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Trade Act of 1974, H.R.
6767 at 82 (1974).
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Under Section 405, a special escape clause procedure is established, whereby
the International Trade Commission is responsible for determining whether
imports of an article manufactured or produced in a country receiving MFN
treatment under Title IV are causing or are likely to cause market disruption
and material injury to a domestic industry. 9 Subsection (c) of Section 405
defines market disruption as existing
whenever imports of a like or directly competitive article are substantial, are increasing
rapidly both absolutely and as a proportion of total domestic comsumption, and are
offered at prices substantially below those of comparable domestic articles.5 0
Upon an affirmative finding of market disruption and material injury, the
Tariff Commission could then grant relief pursuant to Section 201(b), the
normal escape clause provision of the Trade Act. The President, in turn, could
then provide import relief in the form of adjustment assistance for the injured
party or by imposition of duties, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions. 5
The statutory language of Section 405 in determining the criteria for import
relief is less definitive and more permissive than comparable provisions in the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)52 and the present Trade
Act. 3 Both Article XIX of the GATT and Section 201(b) of the Trade Act
specify certain causation links between the increase in imports and injury in
domestic industry. The market disruption standard of Section 405 is less
stringent in this context, simply requiring causation of injury without any
qualification. 4 Such terms as "substantial," "increasing rapidly" and "substantially below," employed in Section 405, do not necessitate precise
definitions and allow for conflicting interpretations.5 5 These criteria for a
determination of material injury are more flexible and cover a broader scope of
import situations than the serious injury test of the GATT and the present
Trade Act, allowing import relief which is unavailable under the more stringent
standards of the latter agreements. s6

11U.S International Trade Commission, the Trade Reform Act of 1973: Analysis and Comparison
(1974).
10H.R. 10710, § 405(c). 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 405(c) (1974).
"Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R. 10710, The
Trade Act of 1974.
'.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
"119 U.S.C. § 1351 (1962).
14See Summary, supra, note 49, at 57.
"Ibid., at p. 58.

16In examining the relationship between the market disruption and the Antidumping Code, 19
U.S.C. § 160-171, the House Report on Trade Reform Act provides that the "provisions of this section
(405) are in addition to the protections already afforded under the Anti-dumping Act."
However, the application of the antidumping provisions in East-West relations causes difficulties in
determination of the less than fair market value sales, which is the basic criteria in antidumping cases.
The domestic prices in the nonmarket economy countries do not reflect cost and market relations; and
the available statistical data is quite limited. Consequently, there are two available alternatives:
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Conclusion
The controversy that has embroiled the most-favored-nation clause spans
political, economic, and legal arenas. Viewing this as a political issue, the
granting of MFN would remove the last vestige of the cold war discriminatory
trade policy in Soviet-American relations. The prospective economic impact of
MFN would be one of stimulating imports, particularly of finished and semifinished products, from nonmarket economic countries, resulting in a definite
increase in the volume of East-West trade. The Socialist countries, on the other
hand, consider the status as basically a legal category. They view their situation
as one of either equality or inequality before the law, and, as expected, they
demand the restoration of non-discriminatory treatment.
In the past, the Congress of the United States has expressed some reservation
as to the necessity of granting MFN status to Socialist countries, feeling that
there should also be some legal protection for American economic interests.
Title IV provides much of this legal protection, as it contains specific provisions
on the limitation of presidential authority, time limits and a veto power by the
Congress. Also operating is Section 405 which attempts to guard against market
disruption, when such legal remedies provided under the GATT and the regular
provision of the Trade Act fail.
The distance is substantial from the cold war embargo to several abortive
trade bills, further still to the granting of non-discriminatory treatment to nonmarket economy countries. Normalization of trade relations by granting MFN
status should be considered a significant, but only an initial, step in the progress
of trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It appears
that both sides have much to gain from the restoration of most-favored-nation
status. In the present climate, it would appear that both economic and political
compromises are essential to effectuate the legal provisions that will allow
increased economic opportunities in the form of trade and greater detente, thus
furthering world peace and human relations.

(1) accepting a constructed less than fair market value, ignoring the actual domestic price, or (2) extending the provisions ofmarket disruption to certain situations. It would appear that the application
of market disruption offers a more effective remedy.
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